Consider variants of the n-hunter StagHunt in which only m hunters, with 2 ? m < n, need to pursue the stag in order tocatch it. (Continue to assume that there is a single stag.) Assume that a captured stagis shared only by the hunters who catch it. Under each of the following assumptions onthe hunters preferences, find the Nash equilibria of the strategic game that models thesituation.
a. Each hunter prefers the fraction 1/n of the stag to a hare.
b. Each hunter prefers the fraction 1/k of the stag to a hare, but prefers a hare to anysmaller fraction of the stag, where k is an integer with m ? k ? n.
c. Suppose there is a church of hunters that always receives 1/10 of the stag (and nothingfrom the hare) and returns nothing to the hunters. How does it affect the behaviorof hunters in the equilibria of the game?
